I Could not Afford to Hang Men for Votes—Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota Pardons by Finkelman, Paul
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 39 | Issue 2 Article 2
2013
I Could not Afford to Hang Men for
Votes—Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian
Concerns, and the Dakota Pardons
Paul Finkelman
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Finkelman, Paul (2013) "I Could not Afford to Hang Men for Votes—Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and the Dakota





“I COULD NOT AFFORD TO HANG MEN FOR VOTES.”1 
LINCOLN THE LAWYER, HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS, 
AND THE DAKOTA PARDONS 
Paul Finkelman† 
 I. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE PARDON ISSUE .......... 409 
 II. WHAT WE CALL THE CONFLICT, AND WHY THAT  
  MATTERS ................................................................................ 414 
 III. WHAT CAUSED THE CONFLICT? ............................................. 419 
 IV. THE POLITICS OF THE CONFLICT ........................................... 422 
 V. THE TRIALS ............................................................................ 424 
 VI. THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE DAKOTA TRIALS .................. 433 
 VII. LIEBER, THE LAW OF WAR, AND THE DAKOTA ....................... 440 




       †  President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public 
Policy, Albany Law School and Senior Fellow in the Government Law Center, 
Albany Law School.  I wrote this article and presented it as a paper at the William 
Mitchell Conference on the Dakota War while I was the John Hope Franklin 
Visiting Professor of American Legal History at Duke Law School.  I received 
wonderful help from the librarians and support staff at both Albany and Duke.  
Research for this article was made possible in part by a summer research grant 
from Albany Law School.  I especially thank Marguerite Most at the Duke Law 
School Library, Robert Emery at the Albany Law School Library, Brittany Edwards-
Franklin, my research assistant at Duke, Fredd Brewer, my administrative assistant 
at Albany, and my assistant at Duke, Raquel Thomas.  I presented earlier versions 
of this paper at workshops at Elon Law School and St. Thomas Law School and 
thank the faculty of both institutions for their suggestions.  For conversations and 
help acquiring some of the materials for this article I thank Daniel W. Stowell, the 
editor of the Papers of Abraham Lincoln, Shawn Rounds, the State Archivist of 
Minnesota, the staff of the Minnesota Historical Society, Colette Routel, Jenny 
Bourne, Amy S. Erickson, Karen Needles, Eric Carpenter, and the staff of the 
William Mitchell Law Review.  I especially thank Tim A. Garrison at Portland State 
University, my Duke colleague Jeff Powell, Jill Dupont at the College of St. 
Scholastica, David Nichols at Indiana State University, and Meave E. Glass at 
Princeton for their perceptive readings of a draft of this article. 
 1.  Diary of Alexander Ramsey (Nov. 23, 1864), quoted in DAVID A. NICHOLS, 
LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS: CIVIL WAR POLICY AND POLITICS 118 (1978) [hereinafter 
LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS]. 
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In a six-week period in August and September 1862, 
Minnesota was the scene of the most violent and bloody conflict 
between Indians and white settlers since the colonial period.2  As 
many as 600 or more white settlers (some contemporary estimates 
put it at 1000), a few hundred soldiers, and somewhere between 
100 (or less) and 300 Indians—almost all members of the Dakota 
Nation (called Sioux at the time)—died in this conflict.3  At the 
time political and military leaders in Minnesota asserted that at 
least 1000 whites died.  While this number may be an exaggeration, 
the fact that most white leaders believed the death toll was this high 
raised emotions and increased demands for executions of the 
Dakota.  Another 300 or so Indians would die in the aftermath, 
some through execution, but many more through harsh conditions 
in post-conflict confinement. 
Following the restoration of peace, General Henry Hastings 
Sibley appointed a military commission, which tried 393 Indians for 
“crimes” connected to the conflict.4  The trials began on September 
28, and by November 5 the military commission had convicted 323 
of the men who were tried.  The commission sentenced 303 men to 
death and provided lesser punishments for twenty others, who were 
convicted only of looting, but were not involved in any combat or 
attacks on white settlers.  Even before the trials were over, President 
Abraham Lincoln exercised his authority, and his obligation, under 
 
 2.  More Indians died in the Second Seminole War and the Red Stick Creek 
war, but these were essentially conflicts between the military and Indians, rather 
than Indian-settler conflicts. 
 3.  David A. Nichols, The Other Civil War: Lincoln and the Indians, MINN. HIST. 
MAG., Spring 1974, at 8.  Estimates of the dead vary from 400 to 800 (or more) 
white civilians and another 200 or so soldiers.  CURTIS A. DAHLIN, THE DAKOTA 
UPRISING: A PICTORIAL HISTORY 1 (2009) (“Estimates of the number of whites killed 
vary widely, with 600 being a conservative estimate.”).  Many sources estimate 
Dakota deaths at 300, although this may be way too high.  Carol Chomsky, citing a 
1923 account of the events, puts the deaths at “77 American soldiers, 29 citizen-
soldiers, approximately 358 settlers, and an estimated 29 Dakota soldiers.”  Carol 
Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43 STAN. 
L. REV. 13, 21–22 (1990).  Chomsky also cites another source for fewer Dakota 
killed.  Id. at 21 n.50.  I believe that Chomsky’s figures, at least for the deaths of 
settlers, are far too modest. 
 4.  There is large literature on the violence in Minnesota, but very little of it 
focuses on the trials, and even less on the pardons.  For the best work on the legal 
aspects of the trials, see Chomsky, supra note 3, and Maeve Herbert, Explaining the 
Sioux Military Commission of 1862, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 743 (2009).  On 
Dakota-white relations from the seventeenth century to the outbreak in 1862, see 
generally GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON, KINSMEN OF ANOTHER KIND (1984). 
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the Militia Act of 1862,5 ordering that no executions could take 
place without his approval.6  On November 8, Major General John 
Pope, Commanding General of the Department of the Northwest, 
forwarded the list of those sentenced to death to Lincoln.7 
Much to the shock of the military and civilian leaders in 
Minnesota, the President did not rubber-stamp these convictions 
and sentences.  Instead, on November 10, Lincoln asked General 
Pope to “[p]lease forward as soon as possible the full and complete 
record of their convictions.”8  Lincoln further told Pope to “have a 
careful statement” indicating “the more guilty and influential of the 
culprits.”9  News of Lincoln’s response led Minnesota Governor 
Alexander Ramsey to immediately weigh-in with his “hope” that 
“the execution of every Sioux Indian condemned by the military 
court will be at once ordered.”10 
The next day General Pope assured Lincoln he would forward 
the record, although in fact it would not arrive until the end of the 
month.11  Meanwhile, Pope lobbied the President to allow the 
executions to go forward.  Even before Lincoln could see the 
 
 5.  Militia Act of 1862, Ch. CCI, § 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598 (“And no sentence of 
death, or imprisonment in the penitentiary, shall be carried into execution until 
the same shall have been approved by the President.”). 
 6.  On October 17, Major General John Pope told General Henry Hastings 
Sibley, “The President directs that no executions be made without his sanction.”  
Letter from John Pope to Henry Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in LINCOLN AND THE 
INDIANS, supra note 1, at 96. 
 7.  Message of the President of the United States in Answer to a Resolution of the 
Senate of the 5th Instant in Relation to the Indian Barbarities in Minnesota: Hearing on S. 
Exec. Res. 7 Before the S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 37th Cong. 1 (1862) (statement of 
Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States) [hereinafter Message of the 
President], available at http://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2008/10/senate            
-executive-document-no-7-from-1862.pdf.  For copies of the original telegraph 
dispatch, dated November 8, 1862, see List of 300 Sioux Sentenced to Death, 
MDEWAKANTON REFERENCE SITE (Jan. 29, 2007, 5:13 PM), http://mdenney. 
proboards.com/index.cgi?board=indianprisoners &action=print &thread=273.  To 
view the first of the twenty pages of names of those sentenced to death, see 
http://i83.photobucket.com/albums/j299/mdenney100/xx/LIST%20OF%20300
%20SIOUX%20SENTENCED%20TO%20DEATH/p1-1.jpg (last visited Nov. 24, 
2012). 
 8.  Letter from Abraham Lincoln to John Pope (Nov. 10, 1862), in 13 U.S. 
WAR DEPT. ET AL., THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES 787 (1885) [hereinafter OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES]. 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Letter from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1862), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8.    
 11.  Message of the President, supra note 7, at 1. 
3
Finkelman: I Could not Afford to Hang Men for Votes—Lincoln the Lawyer, Huma
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
408 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:2 
evidence, Pope assured him that “the only distinction between the 
culprits is as to which of them murdered most people or violated 
most young girls.  All of them are guilty of these things in more or 
less degree.”12  After reflecting on the issue, Pope then sent the 
President a telegram suggesting an alternative to Lincoln executing 
the Sioux under federal law.  The general suggested that “the 
Criminals be turned to the State Govt to be dealt with.”13  At the 
end of the month, Governor Ramsey made a similar offer, telling 
the President, “[i]f you prefer it turn them over to me & I will 
order their Execution.”14  Both the General and the Governor were 
desperate to see the Indians executed by some authority.  Neither 
understood that Lincoln’s concerns for due process and fairness—
and his discomfort with needless killing—would not be eliminated 
by substituting a state executioner for a federal hangman.  Nor did 
either man apparently understand that Lincoln was not the kind of 
leader who would shift responsibility to someone else so he would 
not have to make a distasteful decision. 
Following Pope’s offer to hand the prisoners over the state, the 
General and the Governor tried to pressure Lincoln to approve the 
executions.  They warned him that if he did not order the 
immediate execution of the Indians there would be “[p]rivate 
revenge,”15 and an “indiscriminate massacre of all the Indians—old 
men, women, and children.”16  Meanwhile, Lincoln learned from 
newspapers and letters that in Minnesota the general public was 
enthusiastic about the mass hanging.  The headline in one paper, 
“DEATH TO THE BARBARIANS,”17 summarized the feelings of 
most whites in the state. 
Lincoln did not respond to the absurd notion that he shift the 
responsibility for the Dakota prisoners to Governor Ramsey and 
state authorities.  Nor did he respond to the threats Pope and 
 
 12.  Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788. 
 13.  Telegraph from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in THE 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS AT THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, available at http:// 
memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/malhome.html [hereinafter THE ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN PAPERS].   
 14.  Telegraph from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 28, 1862), 
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13. 
 15.  Letter from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 10, 1862), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 787. 
 16.  Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788. 
 17.  Chomsky, supra note 3, at 29. 
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Ramsey articulated or to the pressures from Minnesota newspapers.  
Lincoln had seen so many newspaper attacks on him since he 
began his run for the presidency that he probably was unaffected 
by the wild harangues from the press in Minnesota.  However, he 
surely must have wondered why the major general he had 
appointed to command the newly created Department of the 
Northwest was incapable of preventing an unruly mob of civilians 
from attacking the Indians who were in his custody.  Lincoln might 
also have wondered why Governor Ramsey was unable to keep the 
peace among his own constituents.  In the end, Lincoln would 
pardon18 the vast majority of the convicted Dakota, despite the 
pressure of his generals, the political leadership of the state, and 
the public press. 
While the hanging of the thirty-eight men was the largest mass 
execution in American history, the decision to reprieve 265 men—
seven out of every eight who were condemned—constituted the 
largest mass clemency of people sentenced to death in American 
history.  This article focuses on a narrow slice of these events: the 
decision by President Lincoln to pardon about eighty-seven percent 
of those who were condemned to die. 
I. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND THE PARDON ISSUE 
With the Civil War raging, almost all of Lincoln’s attention was 
focused on defeating the Confederacy and preserving the Union.  
With mounting Union army casualties exceeding 100,000,19 the fate 
 
 18.  Technically Lincoln did not “pardon” any of the Dakota prisoners, but 
merely refused to authorize their execution.  However, at the time everyone 
understood that these were pardons, and contemporaries used that term in 
describing them.  In reality, once the prisoners were reprieved, they were 
effectively pardoned, and eventually released from custody.  For use of the term 
pardon, see for example, a letter in which Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt 
told Lincoln that if he certified some of the convicted men to be executed it was 
“merely an approval of the sentences, and a refusal to pardon.”  Letter from 
Joseph Holt to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 1, 1862), in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, 
supra note 13.   
 19.  “Casualties” refer to those killed, wounded, and missing.  By the end of 
1862 more than 15,500 U.S. soldiers had been killed in major battles (where there 
were more than 500 casualties on the Union side), more than 69,000 U.S. soldiers 
had been wounded, and more than 52,000 were missing or captured.  See 
FREDERICK PHISTERER, STATISTICAL RECORD OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES 
213–15 (1883).  Tens of thousands of other soldiers had died or were 
incapacitated from disease related to the war.  Id.  With high mortality rates from 
wounds and disease many of those who had not died in battle would die later, as 
would many who were captured and sent to Confederate POW camps.  Id.  A few 
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of a few hundred Indians in Minnesota should not have been very 
significant to Lincoln.  If anything, Lincoln had as much reason as 
the people in Minnesota to be furious at the Dakota who made war 
on the United States.  They had been living peacefully in the state, 
they were reasonably well integrated into the society, and many of 
them knew and regularly interacted with whites.20  Whatever their 
grievances, murderous attacks directed mostly at innocent civilians 
could hardly be justified. 
The violence in Minnesota also threatened the larger security 
of the nation.  The acts of the Dakota warriors forced Lincoln to 
devote troops, horses, arms, money, and time to pacify the frontier 
when he desperately needed these military assets for the ongoing 
war for the Union.  In the end, the United States ended up 
diverting only a few thousand troops to Minnesota, but when the 
violence began, Lincoln had no idea how many troops he would 
have to send there, and how long they would be there.  Three days 
after the violence in Minnesota broke out, the United States 
suffered a humiliating defeat at the Second Battle of Bull Run.  
Lincoln faced a crisis in the military—not knowing who he should 
choose for his new field commander, only knowing he had to get 
rid of the defeated General John Pope.  The Indian conflict in 
Minnesota was an unanticipated complication for Lincoln that had 
the potential to divert huge resources from the war against the 
Confederacy.  Initially, the administration feared the events in 
Minnesota were part of a Confederate conspiracy to open up a new 
front on the western frontier.21  Horace Greeley, the influential but 
not always accurate editor of the New York Tribune, published an 
unsigned editorial asserting that the Dakota were “stimulated if not 
bribed to plunder and slaughter their White neighbors” by agents 
“sent . . . by the Secessionists.”22  Similarly, the New York Times 
 
thousand more soldiers had been killed or wounded in smaller engagements, 
including the battles in Minnesota.  Id. 
 20.  Chomsky, supra note 3, at 91–92.  Chomsky further notes that many of 
the Dakota had been interacting with white society and thus fully understood the 
gravity of their offenses.  Id. at 92.  General Sibley asserted they were not “wild and 
ignorant savages” who could be excused for behavior that offended American law 
and culture.  Id. 
 21.  The Secretary of the Interior made such claims in his report to Congress 
in December, 1862.  See Report of the Secretary of the Interior, in 2 MESSAGE OF THE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS AT THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THE THIRD SESSION OF THE THIRTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS, 37TH 
CONG., 8–9 (1862).  
 22.  Gerald S. Henig, A Neglected Cause of the Sioux Uprising, MINN. HIST. MAG., 
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reported that the “Indians are in league with the rebels.”23  While 
this proved not to be true, when the conflict began the 
administration could not be certain that this was not a southern 
conspiracy.  Even after the Dakota had been completely 
suppressed, some people in the administration continued to 
express fears that it was part of a Confederate conspiracy that might 
break out again.  On December 1, Secretary of the Interior Caleb 
Smith reported to Congress that “the chief cause” of the events in 
Minnesota “is to be found in the insurrection of the southern 
States.”24  Smith was certain that “southern emissaries”25 had 
convinced the Dakota to go to war against the United States and 
the settlers.  In retrospect, we know these fears were completely 
unfounded, but at the time some in the administration were fearful 
that the events in Minnesota were tied to the larger Civil War.  
Thus, the violence perpetrated by the Dakota clearly harmed not 
just the people in Minnesota, but the whole nation. 
There was yet one more complication caused by the outbreak 
in Minnesota.  At the time of the outbreak Lincoln had written the 
preliminary emancipation proclamation and was waiting for a 
decisive military victory to provide him with an opportunity to 
announce his plans for ending slavery in the Confederacy.26  He 
would not announce emancipation until he had a major military 
victory in the East.  Shifting troops and resources to Minnesota 
could potentially have forced Lincoln to move troops—badly 
needed in the East—to the West.  The events in Minnesota were 
not simply a distraction for the President; they threatened to 
derail—or at least delay—a major policy shift.  For Lincoln, this 
outbreak on the Minnesota plains could hardly have come at a 
worse time.  In the end, the conflict in Minnesota did not require 
as many troops as Lincoln feared; the administration needed only a 
few thousand troops to defeat the Dakota.  But, shifting troops to 
 
Fall 1976, at 107, 109 (quoting Editorial, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 25, 1862, at 4). 
 23.  Are the Indians Allies of the Rebels?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1862, at 4. 
 24.  The Secretary of the Interior made such claims in his report to Congress 
in December 1862.  See Report of the Secretary of the Interior, supra note 21, at 8.   
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Paul Finkelman, Lincoln, Emancipation, and the Limits of Constitutional 
Change, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 349, 361–62.  For further discussion on Lincoln’s plan 
to announce the Emancipation Proclamation see Paul Finkelman, Lincoln and the 
Preconditions for Emancipation: The Moral Grandeur of a Bill of Lading, in LINCOLN’S 
PROCLAMATION: EMANCIPATION RECONSIDERED 13–44 (William A. Blair & Karen 
Fisher Younger eds., 2009); see also LOUIS P. MASUR, LINCOLN’S HUNDRED DAYS: 
THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION AND THE WAR FOR THE UNION (2012).  
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the West, creating a whole new military district, and then focusing 
on the trials of the Dakota and their pending executions were 
distractions Lincoln did not need or want. 
Lincoln also had strong political reasons for supporting the 
executions.  Just as the trials of the Dakota were winding down, 
Lincoln and his party had been badly bruised in the 1862 midterm 
elections, losing twenty-two House seats, and holding control of the 
House of Representatives only with the help of a block of war 
Democrats who called themselves Unionists.  The Republicans lost 
control of state legislatures in Illinois and Indiana and the New 
York governorship.  This backlash was caused by war weariness and 
the general weakness of the Union war effort in the East.  
Opposition to Lincoln’s plans for emancipation, announced in late 
September, hurt the Republicans in some places, especially in the 
lower Midwest and among Irish immigrants in New York City.  
Under these circumstances Lincoln could hardly afford to risk 
alienating voters in Minnesota, who at this time were 
overwhelmingly Republican.  In Minnesota, there was enormous 
popular support for executing all of the convicted Indians.  In the 
calculus of good and evil, suffering and redemption, Lincoln might 
have easily concluded that the lives of a few hundred Indians—all 
of whom appeared to have made war on settlers—was a small cost 
to shore up support for saving the nation and reshaping the 
ongoing national conflict into a war for freedom and 
emancipation. 
Yet, despite these obvious reasons for simply allowing the 
executions to go forward, Lincoln did not do so.  Instead, he and 
his staff reviewed all the convictions.  In the process he concluded 
that many of the charges against the Dakota were exaggerated or 
bogus.  As one historian has noted, “[e]arly accounts of the 
uprising seized upon the occasional instances of torture and 
mutilation, exaggerated them, and conjured up a picture of 
wholesale atrocities unparalleled in the history of Indian warfare.”27  
A letter from Minnesota Senator Morton S. Wilkinson and the 
state’s two Congressmen detailed “fiendish brutality,” murders in 
“cold blood,” and gang rapes.28  All three were Republicans and 
Wilkinson was an ally of Lincoln.  This somewhat hysterical letter 
 
 27.  ROY W. MEYER, HISTORY OF THE SANTEE SIOUX: UNITED STATES INDIAN 
POLICY ON TRIAL 120 (1967). 
 28.  Letter from M. S. Wilkinson, Cyrus Aldrich, and Wm. Windom to 
Abraham Lincoln, in Message of the President, supra note 7, at 2–4. 
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was full of allegations that Lincoln politely described as “statements 
of fact not found in the records of the trials.”29  Indeed, as the 
historian Roy Meyer notes, “Like Falstaff’s story of the men he 
battled . . . the closer these stories are scrutinized, the less 
foundation there seems to be for them.”30  Similarly, General Pope 
had told Lincoln, although he knew better, that all of the men 
sentenced to death had murdered civilians and ravished women 
and girls “in more or less degree.”31  After his examination of the 
record, Lincoln discovered that the persistent assertions 
throughout the conflict and its aftermath of rapes and the 
slaughtering of women, children, and captives were vastly 
overstated and mostly false.  Lincoln concluded that only two of the 
condemned men had actually raped anyone,32 although a number 
of other convicted men had killed civilians, including women and 
children.  In the end, Lincoln refused to authorize the executions 
of 265 of the 303 men sentenced to die, effectively pardoning 
them. 
On December 26, 1862, the army hanged thirty-eight Dakota 
men.33  Some of those executed had in fact killed civilians 
needlessly, murdered captured prisoners, defiled dead bodies, and 
raped captured women and girls.34  Under the rules of war at the 
time, the men who committed these acts were legitimately executed 
for what today we would call “war crimes.”  However, the 
overwhelming majority of those sentenced to death, and many of 
those actually executed, were almost certainly innocent of such 
 
 29.  Id. at 1. 
 30.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 120. 
 31.  Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788.   
 32.  Message of the President, supra note 7, at 1.  Other Dakota may have been 
involved in rapes and other barbarities, but they were either killed in battle or 
escaped north with Little Crow and were not captured and tried at this time.  See 
DUANE SCHULTZ, OVER THE EARTH I COME: THE GREAT SIOUX UPRISING OF 1862, at 
245, 249 (1992). 
 33.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 27, 1862), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 880 (“I 
have the honor to inform you that the 38 Indians and half-breeds ordered by you 
for execution where hung yesterday at Mankato, at 10 a.m.  Everything went off 
quietly, and the other prisoners are well secured.”).   
 34.  At least one of those executed, a man named Chaskay, was clearly 
innocent, and in fact had saved the lives of whites.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 130.  
Lincoln reprieved him at the last minute, but another man with a similar name, 
was reprieved instead.  Id.  This tragedy illustrates the arbitrary nature of the trials, 
the absurd rush to judgment by the military, the failure of the military to assess 
individual guilt, and the generally slipshod nature of the records of the trials. 
9
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offenses.  Despite the war crimes committed by some of those 
executed, the whole episode is rightly condemned as a barbaric 
blot on the nation.  It is remembered as the largest mass execution 
in American history. 
Given racial sensibilities in the nineteenth century and cultural 
hostility to Indians, we should probably not be surprised by the 
attempt to perpetrate this needless slaughter of people who were 
already incarcerated.  The 303 death sentences were more 
vengeance than justice.  The military and political leaders in 
Minnesota, as well as a majority of whites in the state, might very 
well have agreed with this analysis, but would have said that this 
vengeance was justified.  As one “humble private citizen” wrote to 
Lincoln, “Not only does justice require the blood of these savages, 
but vengeance will have it,” and if the Indians were not hanged, 
“[e]very man will become an Avenger.”35  Thus, the more 
interesting question is not why so many men were sentenced to die, 
or even why so many were executed, but why so many—seven times 
as many—were not executed.  While we remember this as the 
largest mass execution in American history, it is worth considering 
why this was also the largest mass pardoning of condemned 
prisoners in American history.  What was it about President Lincoln 
that led him to effectively pardon eighty-seven percent of those 
who were sentenced to die? 
II. WHAT WE CALL THE CONFLICT, AND WHY THAT MATTERS 
Any discussion of the conflict in Minnesota in August and 
September 1862 is complicated by language, perception, and 
cultural values.  Indeed, even what we call the conflict is contested.  
When the conflict began, the politicians and military leadership in 
Minnesota called it a war.  But when the conflict was over it became 
known as the Great Sioux Uprising.  More recently it was called the 
Dakota War, taking the emphasis off the conflict as an uprising.  
Most scholars and public institutions now call it the U.S.-Dakota 
War, implying that it was a war between two sovereignties.36  How 
 
 35.  Letter from Thaddeus Williams to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 22, 1862), in 
THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13 (emphasis added).  Williams was a 
physician in St. Paul.  His hysterical letter described numerous atrocities against 
settlers, including the beheading of prisoners, people nailed to trees, 
disemboweling of people, and other horrors which in fact had not taken place. 
 36.  For example, the exhibit at the Minnesota History Center 
commemorating the sesquicentennial of the conflict calls it the U.S.-Dakota War.  
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we categorize the conflict affects how we see the events that 
followed its conclusion.  If it was an “uprising” then the Indian 
combatants were not “soldiers,” but more like hooligans or 
criminals, an unruly—but well-armed—mob randomly causing 
violence and death.  An uprising is essentially a criminal act, 
perpetrated by malcontents who know they are acting illegally.  
Thus, those in an uprising might be subject to trial and 
punishment.  On the other hand, if it was a “war” between two 
sovereign nations, as Carol Chomsky argues, then the captured 
Dakota soldiers should have been “treated as legitimate 
belligerents.”37  Once defeated they were prisoners of war and not 
subject to criminal prosecution, unless they had actually committed 
war crimes. 
None of these terms fully or adequately describe the events of 
that fall, however.  The vast majority of the Dakota in Minnesota 
did not take part in the conflict.  “The Sioux were at no time 
united, at no time committed as a nation to the purposes of the 
hostile minority.”38  Indeed, most of the Dakota in Minnesota 
opposed the resort to violence on ethical grounds and for practical 
reasons.39  The war, if that is what it was, cannot be seen as a war 
between two sovereignties,40 because the Dakota Nation did not 
authorize the war and most leaders of the Dakota opposed it.  Many 
Dakota had converted to Christianity, adopted western dress and 
customs, become farmers, and were therefore unwilling to return 
to their past lives.  In addition, most Dakota understood that a war 
with the United States was essentially suicidal.  Thus, designations 
such as the “Sioux Uprising,” the “Dakota War,” or the “U.S-Dakota 
War” imply much greater support among the Dakota than there 
actually was.41 
 
Commemorating the U.S.-Dakota War of 1862, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, http://legacy.mnhs 
.org/featured-projects/commemorating-us-dakota-war-1862 (last visited Nov. 24, 
2012). 
 37.  Chomsky, supra note 3, at 15. 
 38.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 118.   
 39.  See id.  Most of the fighting was done by members of the lower Sioux, but 
“most of the principle chiefs of both the lower and upper Sioux, such as Wabasha, 
Wacouta, Traveling Hail (who had won the election for speaker), Red Iron, and 
Standing Buffalo, were opposed to the uprising and either took no part or joined 
very reluctantly in a few battles, meanwhile giving all the aid they safely could to 
white victims.”  Id. 
 40.  Contra Chomsky, supra note 3, at 74–76 (arguing otherwise). 
 41.  An analogous naming issue can be seen in the “Red Stick War” of 1811, 
between the “Red Stick” Creeks and the United States.  In that war the Lower 
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It is also not clear whether the Dakota in Minnesota, in 1862, 
were a sovereign nation, at least under American law.  By 1862, the 
Dakota had ceded almost all their land in Minnesota to the U.S. 
government42 and lived on a tiny sliver of what had once been their 
vast territory.  In return for this land the Dakota had accepted 
annual payments—annuities—from which they purchased most of 
their food and other necessities.  As such they were almost entirely 
dependent on the U.S. government for their survival through the 
annuities.  Indeed, the failure of the annuities to arrive was what 
caused the outbreak of violence in the first place.  While Indians 
further west who had not signed treaties, and had not given up 
almost all of their economic independence, might be considered 
“legitimate belligerents in wartime,” to use Professor Chomsky’s 
phrase,43 it is not entirely clear this theory would apply to the 
Dakota in Minnesota who had in fact ceded almost all aspects of 
their sovereignty to the United States.  To use Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s terminology from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,44 we might 
argue that the Dakota in Minnesota had been reduced to 
something far less than even “domestic dependent nations.”45  But, 
even if this is an incorrect analysis,46 the Dakota had not made war 
on the United States.  Only a small group of the Dakota had.  After 
the conflict was over the military would punish all the Dakota in 
Minnesota, even those who had protected whites and did not join 
in the conflict.  This is rightly condemned as punishing the group 
for actions of a small minority within the group.47  But, the logic of 
this condemnation cuts in both directions.  If it was wrong to 
punish all the Dakota because of what a small group did—and it 
was surely wrong on legal and moral grounds—then it is impossible 
 
Creeks, as well as the Choctaw and Cherokee, were allied with the United States, 
against a separatist group of Creek known as the “Red Sticks.”  While earlier 
historians called this the “Creek War,” it is more properly called the Red Stick War 
or the Creek Civil War today, recognizing that the Creek were themselves deeply 
divided in this conflict.  For more information on the Red Stick War, see ROBERT 
V. REMENI, ANDREW JACKSON AND HIS INDIAN WARS 62–77 (2001). 
 42.  See Treaty with the Yankton Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743; Treaty with 
the Sioux—Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands, July 23, 1851, 10 Stat. 949. 
 43.  Chomsky, supra note 3, at 75. 
 44.  30 U.S. 1 (1831). 
 45.  Id. at 17. 
 46.  As Professor Chomsky would argue in Chomsky, supra note 3, at 76–77. 
 47.  Andrew Jackson had done the same thing to the entire Creek Nation, 
after the Red Stick War, even though a majority of the Creek had opposed the Red 
Stick, and many of the Creek had fought alongside Jackson against the Red Stick.  
See REMENI, supra note 41, at 75–77. 
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to argue that the Dakota who did fight represented a sovereign 
nation going to war against the United States.  It may be true that 
the United States recognized the right of the Dakota Nation “to 
make war.”48  But in Minnesota in 1862, the Dakota Nation did not 
go to war with the United States.  Only a small group of Dakota did. 
Thus, both the terms “uprising” and “war” seem imprecise.  An 
uprising implies the illegitimacy of the participants.  And it might 
imply a relatively short time frame.  An uprising seems to be 
something like a riot, but larger and longer lasting.  But the events 
in Minnesota lasted about six weeks, and claimed as many as 1000 
lives, or more.  This was surely bigger than an uprising. 
But, was it a “war”?  There was no declaration of war or even an 
agreement among the Dakota that they should commence 
hostilities.  The army talked about it as a war, but in reality, neither 
Congress nor the President saw the conflict in Minnesota as a true 
war.  The events in Minnesota stood in marked contrast from the 
ongoing Civil War.  Neither side followed accepted rules of 
behavior in a war.  The Dakota mostly killed civilians, and fought 
only a few engagements with the army.  Similarly, as the conflict 
came to an end, the army rounded up thousands of non-
combatants, including those who did not support the violence, and 
destroyed their crops and homes.  There were three or four 
skirmishes between the Dakota warriors and the U.S. Army, and 
one decisive military engagement, the Battle of Wood Lake, on 
September 23, when somewhere between 700 and 1200 Dakota 
were forced to retreat from a force led by Colonel Henry H. 
Sibley.49  While a few hundred soldiers may have died, most of the 
whites killed were civilians including a significant number of 
women and children.  These do not seem to be the statistics or the 
demographics of a traditional war.  After the war—if that is what it 
was—the army acted in violation of almost every acceptable 
standard of behavior for the treatment of prisoners and civilians.  
Indeed, leaders in Minnesota, including General John Pope, 
General Henry Sibley, and Governor Alexander Ramsey, spoke of 
exterminating the Dakota, and while not actually embarking on a 
campaign of genocide, they hinted that this was their ultimate 
goal.50  Dakota civilians who had nothing to do with the conflict 
 
 48.  Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 583 (1832) (McLean, J., concurring). 
 49.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 115–23; KENNETH CARLEY, THE SIOUX UPRISING OF 
1862, at 58–59 (1961). 
 50.  See infra notes 90–108 and accompanying text. 
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were rounded up, their crops were burned, their housing 
destroyed, and they were interned in camps that would be 
precursors of how the British treated the Boers in South Africa a 
half-century later.51  Much of the behavior of the army after the 
conflict was over can only be described as racist vengeance, 
perpetrated against innocent civilians who had taken no part in the 
conflict, and some of whom had provided shelter for fleeing white 
settlers.  Meanwhile, in violation of the traditional rules of war, 
combatants were put on trial and sentenced to death, on the theory 
that they had not been involved in a legitimate war, but rather had 
participated in some illegal violent activity. 
If not an “uprising” or a “war,” perhaps it should be called a 
revolution or a rebellion, since in a very classic sense, this was a 
rebellion against the rule of the United States.  Alternatively, it 
might be more precise to call this Little Crow’s War, after the 
Dakota chief who led the relatively small minority of the Dakota in 
their brief war.52  Those Dakota who followed Little Crow may have 
seen themselves as citizens of a sovereign nation fighting for their 
independence and defending their very existence against callous 
policies by agents of the U.S. government.  They may have believed 
their actions were justified by desperate circumstances. 
Whatever the terminology, there is yet one more way to 
analyze the events.  The Dakota who fought against the army were 
involved in warfare, even if they represented only a minority of the 
Dakota Nation.  As will be noted below,53 even if the technical rules 
of international law and conventional declarations of war were not 
present, the United States should have treated the Dakota soldiers 
as legitimate belligerents, just as it was treating Confederate 
soldiers, who fought an undeclared war for a putative nation that 
no other country in the world recognized as legitimately a 
sovereign state. 
 
 51.  The British used the term “concentration camp” for the facilities used to 
intern Afrikaans civilians during the Boer War.  The camp at Pike Island, which 
held about 1600 Dakota civilians, may in fact have been the world’s first 
concentration camp.  About 300 Dakota died in this camp from disease and 
malnutrition.  See Mark Joy, U.S. Dakota War of 1862, in 2 PAUL FINKELMAN & TIM 
ALAN GARRISON, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY AND LAW 804 
(2009). 
 52.  This would mirror the name of the war in Illinois in 1832–1833, known as 
Black Hawk’s War. 
 53.  See infra Part VII. 
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III. WHAT CAUSED THE CONFLICT? 
The Dakota who fought believed they had no choice, because 
their very existence was threatened by white settlers, Indian agents 
in Minnesota, and the policies of the National Government.  The 
initial cause was the delay in the annuity payments and the reality 
that the Dakota were facing starvation.  As the Dakota leader 
Robert Hakewaste later recalled, “We were starving and in a 
desperate state of mind.”54  There were many underlying causes, 
including the corruption of the Indian agents and the often 
dishonest practices of the Indian traders, who persistently appeared 
to cheat the Indians out of much of their annuities.  Beyond these 
economic issues were cultural conflicts.  The Dakota who fought—
mostly young men of the Mdewakanton band associated with Little 
Crow—felt squeezed by settlers and government policies, and they 
saw no future for themselves or their people.  Dakota Chief Big 
Eagle, who opposed the violence, recalled that “the whites were 
always trying to make the Indians give up their life and live like 
white men,”55 and this was something many Dakota had no interest 
in doing.  Big Eagle thought the demands for change were coming 
too quickly and were accompanied by enormous white arrogance 
and racism.56  These ongoing issues, combined with the imminent 
starvation, delay in the annuity payments, and callousness on the 
part of the Indian agents and traders, led to the violence. 
Under the treaties of 185157 and 185858 the Dakota had ceded 
most of southern Minnesota to the national government in 
exchange for annual “annuity payments” for fifty years.  The 
Dakota were slowly transitioning to a farming culture and lacked 
 
 54.  Evidence for Defendants, Sisseton & Wahpeton Bands v. United States, 
39 Ct. Cl. 172 (1904) (No. 22524), reprinted in GARY CLAYTON ANDERSON & ALAN R. 
WOOLWORTH, THROUGH DAKOTA EYES: NARRATIVE ACCOUNTS OF THE MINNESOTA 
INDIAN WAR OF 1862 32 (1988).  However, historian Gary Clayton Anderson argued 
that in mid-August the Dakota began to harvest what was the most abundant crop 
in memory and that by mid-August the Dakota had an abundance of food, and the 
serious food shortage that existed just a few weeks before no longer existed.  See 
Gary Clayton Anderson, Myrick’s Insult: A Fresh Look at Myth and Reality, MINN. HIST. 
MAG., Spring 1983, at 198, 200, available at http://collections.mnhs.org 
/MNHistoryMagazine/articles/48/v48i05p198-206.pdf. 
 55.  Jerome Big Eagle, A Sioux Story of War, reprinted in ANDERSON & 
WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 23. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Treaty with the Sioux—Sisseton and Wahpeton Bands, July 23, 1851, 10 
Stat. 949. 
 58.  Treaty with the Yancton Sioux, Apr. 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743.  
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enough land to survive by hunting and fishing.59  They depended 
on the annuity payments for their very survival.  But often they were 
cheated out of some of their money by corrupt Indian agents and 
Indian traders.  In 1862, for instance, the Indian traders claimed 
half of the annuity for payment of goods previously given to the 
Dakota, even though some Dakota, such as Joseph Wabasha, had 
never agreed to this transfer of funds.60  Even though Wabasha 
opposed violence, he, like many other Dakota, believed he had 
been cheated out of his annuity by the Indian traders.  He recalled 
that, “the young men of the tribe . . . felt very angry” and “would 
not submit to having half of their annuity taken from them.”61  The 
conflict began in August 1862 at least in part because the annual 
payments “were months late in arriving.”62  Rumors were rife that 
they might never be paid because the federal government was 
bankrupt or because the Confederates had so disrupted the 
economy that there was no money to send.63  There were also 
rumors that rather than being paid in gold, the Dakota annuities 
would be paid in newly printed greenbacks, which the Indian 
traders reportedly might not accept.64  Gold coin had to be sent 
from Washington, but the Civil War impacted all government 
operations, including shipping gold west.  The focus of the 
administration was on the ongoing War of the Rebellion.  
Transportation west was complicated by military requirements, and 
of course gold itself was more scarce than usual.  Thus, the 
allotments were very late.  But, the Dakota depended on these 
allotments for their very survival, and by late August they were 
desperately running out of food.65 
The Upper Indian Agency at Yellow Medicine, fearful of 
violence from the Indians, and perhaps out of compassion for the 
Indians who faced starvation, began to distribute food in advance 
of the annuity payments.  Officials at the Lower Agency at 
Redwood, however, lacked such foresight or compassion and 
 
 59.  Henig, supra note 22, at 107.  
 60.  ANDERSON & WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 12–13.  
 61.  Papers Relating to Talks and Councils Held with the Indians in Dakota and 
Montana Territories in the Years 1866–1869, at 90–91 (1910), reprinted in ANDERSON & 
WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 30. 
 62.  ANDERSON & WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 13.  
 63.  Henig, supra note 22, at 108. 
 64.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 112–13; Chomsky, supra note 3, at 17. 
 65.  Ironically, the gold for the annuities arrived in St. Paul on August 16 and 
at Fort Ridgley on August 18, by which time the conflict had begun and a number 
of white settlers were dead.  See MEYER, supra note 27, at 113.  
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refused to allow the Dakota to purchase food on credit, in advance 
of the allotment, even though the Lower Agency had plenty of food 
on hand to distribute to the Indians.  Some traders did not trust 
the Dakota to pay their debts, while others had absolutely no 
sympathy for the desperation of the Dakota.  This attitude was 
famously expressed by an Indian trader named Andrew Myrick who 
declared: “So far as I am concerned, if they are hungry, let them eat 
grass.”66  Little Crow’s followers responded to this callousness with 
violence. 
Frustrated and hungry, on August 17, 1862, a few Dakota 
attacked a white farmstead near Acton, in Meeker County, killing 
Robinson Jones, his wife, his adopted daughter, and two other 
white men.67  Within a day the Rebellion was in full force.  Dakota 
swept through isolated farms and small towns.  By mid-September 
large numbers of settlers—probably no fewer than 600 and perhaps 
as many as 800 to 1000—had been killed, much of the town of New 
Ulm had been destroyed, and as many as 20,000 settlers in western 
Minnesota had fled to St. Paul.68  These farmers, who were 
innocent of hostile acts toward the Dakota, lost their crops, which 
they had to abandon in the fields, and suffered enormous 
hardships.  More than a hundred other settlers, the majority of 
them women and children were also captured by the Dakota.  A few 
were murdered after their capture, and some of the women may 
have been raped.  The Rebellion was effectively over on September 
23, when the Minnesota militia and federal troops defeated the 
Dakota at the Battle of Wood Lake.  After the battle, hundreds of 
 
 66.  DOUGLAS O. LINDER, THE DAKOTA CONFLICT TRIALS, http:// 
law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/dakota/Dak_account.html (last visited 
Nov. 24, 2012).  Myrick would be killed on the first day of the conflict, and grass 
was stuffed into his mouth.  Curt Brown, In the Footsteps of Little Crow 150 Years After 
the U.S.-Dakota War, STAR TRIB., Aug. 15, 2012, available at 2012 WLNR 17306280.  
This quotation is found in almost every account of the conflict.  See ANDERSON & 
WOOLWORTH, supra note 54, at 198 (providing a history of the story of Myrick’s 
insult and suggesting that it may not have taken place, or that it was not one of the 
precipitating events leading to the violence); see also “Let Them Eat Grass” Revisited, 
A THRILLING NARRATIVE OF INDIAN CAPTIVITY: DISPATCHES FROM THE DAKOTA WAR OF 
1862 (Aug. 17, 2012, 2:44 PM), http://athrillingnarrative.com/2012/08/17/let      
-them-eat-grass-revisited/ (arguing that “Myrick is not the central character in this 
story; he simply got the most quotable line.”). 
 67.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 115.  
 68.  For a description of the burning of much of New Ulm, see HANK H. COX, 
LINCOLN AND THE SIOUX UPRISING OF 1862 103–04 (2005).  For various descriptions 
of the military conflict, see DAHLIN, supra note 3, at 1; MEYER, supra note 27, at 120; 
SCHULTZ, supra note 32, at 249; Nichols, supra note 3, at 8. 
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Dakota immediately surrendered and most of the rest were quickly 
captured, although their leader, Little Crow, managed to escape 
into Canada.69 
IV. THE POLITICS OF THE CONFLICT 
The conflict began on August 18.  Almost immediately, 
Governor Alexander Ramsey appointed Henry Hastings Sibley to 
organize a defense of the state.  Sibley had been the first governor 
of the state of Minnesota, and in 1862, and at the outbreak of 
violence, was appointed a colonel in the state militia, making him 
the highest ranking military officer in the state.70  On August 21, 
Governor Ramsey telegraphed Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, 
asking for help71 while Minnesota’s Secretary of State asked 
Assistant Secretary of War, Christopher P. Wolcott, for 
authorization to raise a cavalry force of 1000 men and to purchase 
a sufficient number of horses for them to ride into battle.72  Five 
days later, Governor Ramsey begged Major General Henry W. 
Halleck, the General-in-Chief of the army, to create a military 
district in the Northwest as a prelude to sending sufficient troops 
and leadership to fully crush the Indians in the region.73  Halleck 
bluntly told the Governor that the “War Department is not 
prepared at present to create a new military department in the 
West.”74 
 
 69.  In July 1863, Little Crow would return to Minnesota with his son.  While 
foraging for food he was shot and killed by a local farmer, Nathan Lamson, who 
received a $500 bounty for killing Little Crow and turning his scalp over to the 
state.  His son was captured and scheduled for execution, but this never 
happened.  Ultimately he was released from custody, perhaps reflecting that even 
in Minnesota people lacked the stomach to execute a child for the “crimes” of his 
father.   
 70.  See Kenneth Carley, The Sioux Campaign of 1862: Sibley’s Letters to His Wife, 
MINN. HIST. MAG., Sept. 1962, at 99, available at http://collections.mnhs.org 
/MNHistoryMagazine/articles/38/v38i03p099-114.pdf.  By the end of September, 
Sibley had been promoted to Brigadier General of Volunteer within the regular 
army.  Id. at 109.  Sibley would later be promoted to Brevet Major General and 
command the Department of the Northwest.  Id. at 114. 
 71.  Telegram of Alexander Ramsey to E. M. Stanton (Aug. 21, 1862 at 4:00 
PM), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 
590.    
 72.  Telegram of J. H. Baker to Hon. C. P. Wolcott (Aug. 21, 1862), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 590–91. 
 73.  Telegram of Alexander Ramsey to Henry Halleck (Aug. 26, 1862 at 2:00 
PM), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 
597. 
 74.  Telegram of H. W. Halleck to Alexander Ramsey (Aug. 29, 1862), in 
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But Halleck missed the political significance of this issue, 
which President Abraham Lincoln did not miss.  Facing midterm 
elections, Lincoln doubtlessly saw creating a military department in 
Minnesota as both politically useful and perhaps necessary to 
restore peace on the northwestern frontier.  Governor Alexander 
Ramsey asked Lincoln to order the War Department to supply 
horses or mounted troops for the conflict, arguing that this “is not 
our war, it is a National War.”75  There is some evidence that 
Lincoln and others in the administration initially may have agreed 
with Ramsey, actually believing, or at least fearing, that the Indian 
violence was the result of Confederate machinations, and thus a 
stronger military presence in Minnesota might be truly necessary 
for the safety of the nation.  In his letter to Assistant Secretary of 
War Wolcott, Minnesota’s Secretary of State said that the Dakota 
violence was a result of a “deep-laid plan.”76  This was actually not 
true, but the Lincoln administration feared it might be true, and 
that Confederate agents were trying to start a wholesale Indian war 
in the West.  Secretary of Interior, Caleb B. Smith, later claimed to 
have evidence that “southern emissaries” had conspired with the 
Dakota.77  Thus, for both military and political reasons, Halleck was 
forced to do a quick about-face, and on September 6, Secretary of 
War Stanton ordered Major General John Pope to “proceed 
immediately” to St. Paul, where he was to assume the position of 
commander of the newly created Department of the Northwest and 
“take such prompt and vigorous measures as shall quell the 
hostilities and afford peace, security, and protection to the people 
against Indian hostilities.”78 
The choice of Pope was curious, but perhaps predictable.  
Pope was a West Point graduate who had had some initial success 
in the West, defeating Sterling Price in Missouri and helping to 
capture a key island in the Mississippi.  He was then transferred to 
the East where he suffered a humiliating defeat at the Second 
Battle of Bull Run just days after outbreak of violence in Minnesota.  
 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 605.   
 75.  Telegram from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Sept. 6, 1862), 
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.   
 76.  Telegram of J. H. Baker to Hon. C. P. Wolcott (Aug. 21, 1862), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 590–91.    
 77.  Nichols, supra note 3, at 5; see also LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, 
at 78.  
 78.  Telegram of E. M. Stanton to John Pope (Sept. 6, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 617.    
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His failure at Bull Run, combined with his almost insufferable 
arrogance, made it impossible to put him in combat against the 
Confederates.  At the same time, Pope did have military and 
logistical skills.  The new department in the Northwest provided 
General Halleck with a place to send Pope while enhancing 
Lincoln’s support in the West.  Pope initially saw his removal to the 
Northwest as a demotion (which after Bull Run he should have 
expected), but quickly used the new post to lead an aggressive 
campaign against the Dakota that he doubtlessly hoped would lead 
to a new command in the real war against the Confederates. 
Pope and Sibley quickly organized a defense of the state, and 
within a few weeks the Dakota had been defeated.  The conflict was 
essentially over after the Battle of Wood Lake, on September 23.  
Hundreds of Dakota soon surrendered to the army, and those who 
had not participated in the conflict came forward with whites they 
had sheltered or rescued from other Dakota who had captured 
them.  Sibley continued to pursue some Dakota into early October, 
rounding up Indians who had not been involved in the conflict.79  
Indeed, the Indian population of Minnesota suffered worse after 
peace was restored than during the conflict.  On October 9, 
General Pope sent a dispatch to General Halleck stating that “[t]he 
Sioux war may be considered at an end.”80 
V. THE TRIALS 
Following the restoration of peace, the army tried 393 Indians 
for the “crime” of going to war with the United States.81  On 
October 3, Colonel Sibley, who by then was actually a brigadier 
general,82 reported that a military tribunal was already at work 
 
 79.  Telegram of John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 4, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 709 (noting that 
Sibley was still pursuing Indians and that he wanted to disarm the Winnebagoes, 
which Pope and Sibley asserted (incorrectly in fact) had been “engaged in the 
recent outrages with the Sioux”); see also Telegram of Henry H. Sibley to John 
Pope (Oct. 5, 1862), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, 
supra note 8, at 711–12 (describing his attempts to capture all remaining Sioux, 
disarm them, and arrest “the men, except the older ones”). 
 80.  Telegram of John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 9, 1862 at 10:45 PM), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 722.    
 81.  See Chomsky, supra note 3; Herbert, supra note 4.   
 82.  Sibley did not find out about this promotion until October 7.  See 
Telegram of Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), in OFFICIAL RECORDS OF 
THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 717.  Technically he was 
Brevet Brigadier General until April 7, 1864, when Congress confirmed this 
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“engaged in the trial of between 20 and 30 of the Indians . . . 
suspected of participating in the murders and outrages committed 
on the frontier.”83  Sibley admitted that ninety percent of those 
Indians in his custody “have not been actively engaged in the war,” 
but he had to ferret out those who had.84  Sibley already assumed 
he would execute those found guilty, but would not order any 
executions until he could persuade all the Indians not in his 
custody to surrender.  He understood that if they heard about 
death sentences “they might be deterred from returning.”85  
General Pope agreed with this analysis, telling General Halleck “it 
will be necessary to try and execute many of those engaged in the 
late horrible outrages, and also some of the Winnebagoes.”86 
These trials were swift and summary.  The Dakota were not 
provided with counsel, as would have been done in a true court 
martial, and most of the trials were shams.87  Without counsel the 
defendants lacked any due process protections, since none of the 
Dakota had any experience with American legal procedure.  Some 
of those prosecuted knew little or no English, but this did not deter 
the military from trying them without defense counsel.  But even 
those who were fluent in English probably did not understand the 
proceedings or that they were even on trial for their lives.88  None 
of the defendants seemed to have had any idea of the legal right 
against self-incrimination.  Indeed, many probably believed that 
honest answers would lead to fair treatment.  This would have 
comported with Native American notions of justice and with the 
understanding of Indian soldiers operating in a traditional honor 
culture.  Thus, many of the defendants admitted to something, 
such as firing a weapon, for example, or riding with Little Crow, 
the leader of the rebellion.  However, they were not always given 
the opportunity to explain what they did—in effect to testify on 
their own behalf and explain their circumstances.89 
 
promotion.  Carley, supra note 70, at 109. 
 83.  Telegram of Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 3, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 707.  
 84.  Id. at 708. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Telegram of John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 7, 1862 at 1:30 PM), in 
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 716. 
 87.  For discussions of the trials, see generally Chomsky, supra note 3 and 
Herbert, supra note 4.   
 88.  Chomsky, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
 89.  See LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 100.   
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These admissions were used to convict many defendants.  
Generals Pope and Sibley both believed that any participation in 
the rebellion was enough to merit a conviction.  This logic flew in 
the face of General Pope’s own assertions to Lincoln after the trials: 
“[T]hat the only distinction between the culprits is as to which of 
them murdered most people or violated most young girls.  All of 
them are guilty of these things in more or less degree.”90  In fact, 
Pope knew better.  But it did not matter because the military 
tribunal essentially held that any participation in the rebellion was 
an offense and that there was no meaningful distinction between 
those who committed what might be regarded as war crimes and 
those who were merely soldiers or fellow travelers in Little Crow’s 
make-shift army. 
In the next six weeks the army tried 393 men, convicting 323 
and sentencing 303 to death.  Many of these hearings—it would be 
too much to call them trials—lasted no more than five or ten 
minutes.91  On the first day alone, sixteen men were tried with ten 
being convicted and sentenced to death.92  On November 3, forty-
two men were tried,93 and on November 5, the last day of the 
proceedings, forty men were tried.94  Assuming an eight-hour day, 
with no pauses between hearings or recesses, this meant that each 
trial lasted an average of twelve minutes or less.  The standard of 
guilt was quite simple: anyone who fired a rifle in any form of 
combat was considered guilty and subject to a death penalty.95 
Sibley’s motivations are not clear.  Some scholars suggest that 
the trials were mostly an act of vengeance by a victorious army.96  
Surely there is an element of that.  The soldiers under Sibley had 
just fought for a month, many of their comrades were dead or 
wounded, and revenge is a common human emotion.  This level of 
vengeance was also present in the civilian community in Minnesota, 
as refugee settlers streamed into St. Paul and it became apparent 
that hundreds of white settlers had been killed.  The civilian 
 
 90.  Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 788.    
 91.  LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 99–101; Chomsky, supra note 3, 
at 25. 
 92.  Chomsky, supra note 3, at 25. 
 93.  Id. at 27. 
 94.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 127. 
 95.  See LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 100–01 (describing the 
trials); see also Chomsky, supra note 3; Herbert, supra note 4.   
 96.  See LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 125–26. 
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community was also inundated with stories (mostly untrue) of 
“outrages” committed against settler women and girls.  All of this 
was enough to lead to calls for vengeance and executions. 
But these procedures also dovetailed with Sibley’s larger goal 
of removing or killing all the Dakota in Minnesota.  At the very 
beginning of the conflict he told his wife, “My preparations are 
nearly completed to begin my work upon them with fire and sword, 
and my heart is hardened against them beyond any touch of 
mercy.”97  He referred to them as “fiends” and “devils in human 
shape.”98  On September 10, he vowed to “pursue” the “red devils” 
with “fire and sword.”99  As the conflict was coming to an end, 
Sibley urged that he be replaced by a “strictly military commander” 
who “would be better fitted” to “follow up the Indians vigorously 
and exterminate them . . . .”100  If Sibley’s goal was extermination of 
the Dakota, for whatever reason, the trials were a step in the right 
direction.  Executing a large number of young men would clearly 
undermine and weaken the entire Dakota society. 
The trials and executions also fit with the views of the highest 
military leader in the state, Major General John H. Pope.  Shortly 
before the hostilities came to an end, Pope predicted that he had 
the fire power to “put a final stop to Indian troubles by 
exterminating or ruining all the Indians engaged in the late 
outbreak.”101  After the decisive battle at Wood Lake, Pope told 
Sibley that “[n]o treaty must be made with the Sioux . . . .”102  
Instead, he was determined to “utterly . . . exterminate the Sioux if 
I have the power to do so and even if it requires a campaign lasting 
the whole of next year.”103  Calling the Sioux “wild beasts,” he 
asserted they deserved “punishment beyond human power to 
inflict,” and urged Sibley to “[d]estroy everything belonging to 
them . . . .”104  While the trials were going on, Pope wrote the 
Secretary of War indicating that he was “anxious to execute a 
 
 97.  Carley, supra note 70, at 99, 101.   
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 106. 
 100.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Sept. 27, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 680.    
 101.  Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 17, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 649.    
 102.  Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Sept. 28, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 686.    
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
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number of them.”105  Pope had destroyed the crops of not only the 
offending Dakota, but of other Dakota who had not been involved 
in the combat and also the Winnebagoes, who had nothing to do 
with the conflict.106  Sibley, who had been one of the first white 
settlers in Minnesota and had served as the first governor of the 
state,107 was even more enthusiastic, expressing the hope at the very 
beginning of the conflict that his forces would “overtake and kill a 
thousand or more of the savages . . . and drive the remainder across 
the Missouri or to the devil.”108 
When faced with the reality of the post-conflict trials, Sibley 
vacillated between wanting swift punishment and mild concerns 
about fairness.  With over 250 prisoners in his care he admitted 
that “[s]ome of them are probably innocent,” but believed “by far 
the greater part will be found guilty of murder, rape, etc.”109  This 
was a significant change from his earlier belief that the vast majority 
of the captured Indians were innocent of any crime.  At this point 
he was planning to send most of these captured men to Fort 
Snelling and regretted that he would “be deprived of the 
gratification of strangling the guilty ones.”110  Two days later he told 
his wife that “the Indian prisoners are being tried as fast as a due 
regard for justice will permit.  I have to review all the proceedings 
 
 105.  1 GIDEON WELLES, DIARY OF GIDEON WELLES SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 
UNDER LINCOLN AND JOHNSON 171 (1911), available at http://archive.org/stream 
/diarygideonwell09wellgoog#page/n230/mode/2up [hereinafter WELLES DIARY]. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  In the late 1830s and early 1840s Sibley had been virtually, although not 
legally, married to an Indian woman, Red Blanket Woman, and fathered a child 
with her, Helen Hastings Sibley.  Jane Lamm Carroll, Who Was Jane Lamont?: Anglo-
Dakota Daughters in Early Minnesota, MINN. HIST. MAG., Spring 2005, at 192, available 
at http://collections.mnhs.org/MNHistoryMagazine/articles/59/v59i05p184-196 
.pdf.  This relationship, known as a marriage “a la facon du pays,” lasted two or 
three years, and Sibley never denied his paternity of Helen, paid for her 
education, helped support her, and gave her away at her wedding in 1859.  Id. at 
192–93.  Sibley later married Sarah Jane Steele, the daughter of a commanding 
general at Fort Snelling.  Sarah Sibley apparently hated that her husband 
maintained a relationship with his half-Dakota daughter.  Id. at 193.  It is difficult 
to know how this earlier relationship affected his views of Indians.  It is possible 
that given his earlier relationship with the Dakota, Sibley felt he had to go to extra 
lengths to prove his bona fide hostility to the Dakota after the rebellion began.   
 108.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Aug. 24, 1862), in EXTRACTS 
FROM GENERAL SIBLEY’S LETTERS TO HIS WIFE, WRITTEN ON THE INDIAN CAMPAIGN 
(R.J. Holcombe ed., 1893), in Herbert, supra note 4, at 753. 
 109.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 13, 1862), in Carley, 
supra note 70, at 110. 
 110.  Id. 
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and decide the fate of each individual.”111  As a young man Sibley 
had read law under the tutelage of his father, Solomon Sibley, the 
first Chief Justice of the Michigan Territory.  Henry Sibley was the 
first Justice of the Peace in the Minnesota Territory.112  But, for all 
this legal background, Sibley clearly had no real sense of due 
process or fair trials, as he reviewed trials that lasted a few minutes 
and sentenced men to death for non-capital offenses on the basis of 
virtually no evidence.  His earlier legal training and his practice 
experience served him poorly in 1862113 and again afterwards when 
he tried to justify his actions.114  At the beginning of the trials he 
did not bother to review the findings of his commission, telling 
General Pope that “the proceedings . . . may not be exactly in form 
in all the details,” but he fully expected to approve all the sentences 
and “hang the villains.”115  Pope would have agreed.  He had 
already told Sibley that he doubted it was possible to assess 
individual guilt and “discriminate between Indians who say they are 
and have been friendly, and those who have not.”116 
Sibley admitted to his wife that the “power of life and death is 
an awful thing to exercise,” telling her “it makes me shudder” to 
“think [that] more than three hundred human beings are subject 
to that power.”117  But, shudder or not, he was prepared to do his 
“duty” and make sure that “judgment [would be] visited upon the 
guilty.”118  By the time the trials were over, Sibley had long 
abandoned any notion of due process.  “A military commission,” he 
told Bishop Henry Whipple, “is not expected to enter into details 
of a technical character,” and was not designed to function like 
“ordinary criminal tribunals” or even like “regular courts-
 
 111.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Carley, 
supra note 70, at 110–11. 
 112.  See Robert J. Sheran & Timothy J. Baland, The Law, Courts, and Lawyers in 
the Frontier Days of Minnesota: An Informal Legal History of the Years 1835 to 1865, 2 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 6 n.33 (1976). 
 113.  See Chomsky, supra note 3, at 93 (arguing that Sibley’s legal training led 
him to use military commissions to provide a semblance of due process). 
 114.  See Herbert, supra note 4, at 794–97 (describing Sibley’s post-execution 
justifications and his desire to bring new hearings, and have new executions in 
March 1863). 
 115.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 717.  
 116.  Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Oct. 2, 1862), in Herbert, 
supra note 4, at 774. 
 117.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), in Carley, 
supra note 70, at 111. 
 118.  Id.  
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martial.”119  This was certainly how Sibley set them into motion, with 
Pope’s acquiescence.  But this was not in fact how they were 
supposed to operate.  In Missouri, the scene of the most violent 
guerilla warfare in the Civil War, the army declared that military 
commissions “should be . . . constituted in a similar manner and 
their proceedings be conducted according to the same general 
rules as courts-martial in order to prevent abuses that might 
otherwise arise.”120  Congress applied this logic to the entire nation 
in The Militia Act of 1862121 by providing for the “same post-
conviction review in both military commissions and courts-
martial.”122 
Other scholars suggest that Sibley and Pope used the trials to 
“protect” the incarcerated Dakota from lynching by the local 
populace.123  Pope and Sibley made this argument, claiming that 
without the summary trials mobs of civilians would have massacred 
many Dakota women, children, and old men in Sibley’s custody.  By 
this time, there were more than 1000 Indians under military 
control.  Trying and executing a sufficient number of combatants 
might have been enough to satisfy the blood lust of most 
Minnesotans, as articulated by one newspaper’s demand that the 
Indians should be “exterminated.”124  Sibley and Pope may have 
believed this was what they were doing, but their arguments were 
surely self-serving.  The Indian non-combatants were in custody 
only because Sibley had been so busy rounding them up and 
forcing them off their lands.  Moreover, the military was surely 
powerful enough to protect the Dakota in custody if Sibley and 
Pope wanted this to occur.  That Sibley and Pope made these 
arguments illustrates their own vacillation over the fate of the 
Dakota.  Both Sibley and Pope had been calling for the 
extermination, annihilation, or total removal of the Dakota.  Yet, 
when faced with the reality of the slaughter of women, children, 
and old men, they stepped back. 
 
 119.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Henry B. Whipple (Dec. 4, 1862), in 
Herbert, supra note 4, at 771. 
 120.  Gen. Orders No. 1, Headquarters Dept. of the Missouri (Jan. 1, 1862) in 
1 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 248.   
 121.  Militia Act of 1862, Ch. CCI, sec. 5, 12 Stat. 597, 598. 
 122.  Louis Fisher, Military Commissions: Problems of Authority and Practice, 24 
B.U. INT’L L.J. 15, 27 n.97 (2006). 
 123.  See, e.g., Chomsky, supra note 3, at 93–94. 
 124.  SCHULTZ, supra note 32, at 243.  For other examples of popular demands 
for “extermination” of the Dakota see MEYER, supra note 27, at 124.    
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Sibley complained that the newspapers thought he was too 
“tender hearted” and that the trials and executions were not 
moving fast enough.125  He insisted he would not “murder any man, 
even a savage, who is shown to be innocent of the ‘great 
transgression,’ or permit of the massacre of women and 
children.”126  But in fact he was pushing the trials along as fast as 
possible and showed little concern for due process, fairness, or 
actual guilt.  Sibley may have been annoyed at pressure from 
newspapers or the civilian public, and he may have formally 
opposed killing native women and children, but he was still 
planning further military expeditions to force these women and 
children to leave Minnesota, and he had little regard for any fair 
investigation of the alleged “crimes” of their husbands, fathers, 
sons, and brothers, who he was planning to execute as quickly as 
possible. 
General Pope told Lincoln that vigilantes were preparing to 
massacre the Dakota.127  Governor Ramsey similarly warned Lincoln 
that “[n]othing but the Speedy execution of the tried and 
convicted Sioux Indians will save us here from Scenes of 
outrage.”128  Civilians did make two attempts to attack Indian 
prisoners in November, but the army easily prevented any 
significant violence, capturing some of the civilian attackers and 
forcing them to march with Indians to Mankato.129  The fears of 
Pope and Ramsey were clearly exaggerated and Lincoln probably 
realized that they could not be taken at face value.  He must have 
intuitively understood that both Pope and Ramsey were trying to 
force him to let the executions go forward.  Clearly, the military 
had more than sufficient force to protect all Indian captives from 
vigilantes, and Pope, as a career officer, had the skill and backbone 
to make sure his soldiers did their duty. 
Another reason for the trials, demands for mass executions, 
and the incarceration of even friendly and cooperative Indians, 
 
 125.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to Sarah Sibley (Oct. 20, 1862), in Carley, 
supra note 70, at 111. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Letter from John Pope to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 24, 1862), quoted in 
Nichols, supra note 3, at 10 n.34. 
 128.  Telegram from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 28, 1862), 
available at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/malquery.html (search for 
“November 28, 1862, Ramsey”; then follow “Alexander Ramsey to Abraham 
Lincoln, Friday, November 28, 1862” hyperlink). 
 129.  Attacks by civilians on the Indian prisoners are described in Carley, supra 
note 70, at 112–13; see also LINDER, supra note 66. 
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involved land and money.  Final removal of the Indians would open 
more land to settlers and remove any fear of future violence.130  
Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles believed that the vengeance 
against the Dakota was part of a larger plan to remove other 
Indians from the state.  This was especially the case when it came to 
the arrest of non-Dakota.  He noted that “the Winnebagoes have 
good land which white men want and mean to have.”131 
In reality there was no need for the trials.  In addition, their 
speed and lack of any semblance of due process were obviously 
unnecessary.  Once the Dakota had surrendered and were under 
military control, they certainly posed no threat to the people of 
Minnesota.  The conflict was over, and there was no chance it could 
resume, given the army’s decisive victory and the overwhelming 
military force General Pope had in Minnesota.  The threats from 
civilian vigilantes, while real, were certainly exaggerated.  The U.S. 
Army could surely have protected the Indians from a mob of angry 
farmers, and in fact, it did so.  Governor Ramsey’s fear of “[s]cenes 
of outrage” were either an admission of his utter incompetence as a 
chief executive (which seems unlikely) or an exaggeration of the 
threats in order to pressure Lincoln to allow the executions to take 
place as quickly as possible.  Ramsey was surely using the threats of 
violence to accomplish his real goal, which was to go forward with 
what would have been highly popular executions.  Indeed, after 
civilians attacked Indians under army guard, and were repulsed, 
Ramsey issued a public proclamation “to avert the disastrous 
consequences of a collision” between the people of Minnesota and 
the United States.132  He urged all citizens to refrain from attacking 
U.S. troops or Indians in the custody of the troops,133 and there 
were no more outbreaks of such vigilante violence. 
The terminology for the events comes directly into play when 
we consider the motivations for the trials.  Throughout the military 
campaigns against the Dakota, both Pope and Sibley referred to the 
“war” with the Dakota.  Pope was a military man at war with the 
enemy.  As such, he and Sibley should have known that trying 
 
 130.  MEYER, supra note 27, at 124–25. 
 131.  See WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 171. 
 132.  Alexander Ramsey, Proclamation to the People of Minnesota (Dec. 6, 1862), 
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem /malquery.html (search for “Alexander Ramsey 
to Minnesota Citizens”; then follow “Alexander Ramsey to Minnesota Citizens, 
Saturday, December 6, 1862” hyperlink). 
 133.  Id. 
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prisoners—except for very specific crimes—was not acceptable 
behavior.  It was not a “crime” to go to war against an enemy.  Many 
Dakota were convicted of shooting at U.S. soldiers.  This was surely 
not a crime. 
While Pope and Sibley did not understand their own 
hypocrisy, Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles did.  As Lincoln 
contemplated what to do with the convicted Dakota, he had to 
cope with letters from Pope and Sibley, editorials, and the demands 
of the Minnesota congressional delegation that the sentences be 
swiftly carried out against all the convicted Indians.  Secretary 
Welles was especially annoyed by the behavior of Senator Morton S. 
Wilkinson and the state’s two Congressmen.  He wondered how 
these “Representatives of a State can deliberately besiege the 
Government to take the lives of these ignorant barbarians by 
wholesale, after they have surrendered themselves prisoners.”134  He 
thought the aggressive and almost bloodthirsty “sentiments of the 
Representatives were but slightly removed from the barbarians 
whom they would execute.”135  The point was clear to Welles if the 
Indians were soldiers who had surrendered, they could not then be 
executed for having been soldiers.  It was a position President 
Lincoln would accept as well. 
VI. THE ADMINISTRATION AND THE DAKOTA TRIALS 
When President Lincoln received General Pope’s list of 
condemned men, he immediately asked for the full records of the 
trials.  Lincoln was a war-time president, and by the end of 1862 he 
was no longer shocked by the human cost of warfare.  But, he was 
also deeply troubled by unnecessary killing.  Throughout his 
presidency, he often commuted sentences of soldiers charged with 
desertion or other infractions.  He understood that warfare cost 
lives, but he was also always reluctant to be the instrument of death 
for people in federal custody.  He reviewed about 1600 court 
martial cases and, much to the annoyance of his generals, issued 
pardons or commutations to almost all the enlisted men charged 
with desertion or most other military offences.136  He also issued at 
least 331 clemency orders for civilians convicted in federal courts.137 
 
 134.  See WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 186. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Pardons & Clemency, MR. LINCOLN’S WHITE HOUSE, http:// 
www.mrlincolnswhitehouse.org/inside.asp?ID=226&subjectID=3 (last visited Nov. 
24, 2012).  Lincoln did not generally commute sentences of soldiers charged with 
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Many of Lincoln’s military and civilian pardons were clearly 
part of his own military strategy.138  His humane attitude towards 
the troops certainly increased morale.  For example, Lincoln never 
signed a warrant for the execution of a common soldier convicted 
of falling asleep while on guard duty.139  In 1864, he issued a 
wholesale pardon for “all deserters, who have been condemned by 
Court Martial to death.”140  He later issued a wholesale pardon to all 
deserters who were not in custody if they would return to their 
units within two months of his proclamation.141  Lincoln almost 
always asked himself the pertinent question whenever a military 
execution came up: “[W]hether this soldier can better serve the 
country dead than living.”142  While Lincoln almost never signed an 
execution warrant for soldiers charged with military infractions like 
desertion or sleeping on duty, and regularly pardoned deserters, he 
rarely commuted sentences for non-military crimes, such as murder 
or rape.143  Lincoln famously issued pardons when lobbied by 
members of Congress, state politicians, and other “respectable” and 
“honorable” citizens.  He was equally susceptible to the entreaties 
of mothers, wives, and sisters seeking to save a son, husband, or 
brother.144  Attorney General Bates complained he was “unfit to be 
trusted with the pardoning power.”145  However, it is also clear that 
Lincoln signed death warrants “only after he had examined the 
facts of each case and determined that the sentence was 
appropriate.”146 
Given this record of issuing pardons, it is perhaps not 
surprising that Lincoln wanted more information from General 
Pope before he was willing to authorize the executions of 303 men.  
Lincoln was troubled by a single execution.  Three hundred and 
 
murder, rape, or other serious non-military offenses.  Id. 
 137.  P. S. Ruckman, Jr. & David Kincaid, Inside Lincoln’s Clemency Decision 
Making, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 84, 84 (1999). 
 138.  Id. at 84–85. 
 139.  Id. at 85. 
 140.  E. D. Townsend, Order Commuting Sentence of Deserters, Gen. Orders 
No. 76 (Feb. 26, 1864), in 7 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 208 (Roy 
P. Basler ed., 1953) [hereinafter COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN]. 
 141.  Abraham Lincoln, Proclamation Offering Pardon to Deserters (March 
11, 1865), in COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, supra note 140, at 349–50.   
 142.  Pardons & Clemency, supra note 136. 
 143.  Ruckman & Kincaid, supra note 137, at 85. 
 144.  Id. at 88–90. 
 145.  Id.  
 146.  Id. at 85. 
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three at one time must have boggled his mind.  If he was worried 
about blood on his hands from the shooting of a teenage deserter, 
as he clearly was, he would surely have been concerned about the 
blood of over 300 men. 
But, these were captured enemies, not American soldiers who 
failed to fully do their duty.  They were accused of barbaric 
treatment of civilians—Lincoln’s own constituents—and of course 
they also killed a substantial number of American soldiers before 
they were finally subdued.  And they were Indians, not whites.  
Lincoln’s relationship with Indians was complicated.  His 
grandfather had been killed by Indians in Kentucky, and his only 
military experience—in which he never saw combat—was in Black 
Hawk’s War.147  Lincoln knew blacks while he was a lawyer in 
Illinois, and even had them as clients, but he had had very few 
interactions with Indians.  They were truly foreign to him. 
Politically, there was little advantage to issuing pardons.  The 
Indians were not constituents.  Lincoln could not score points with 
voters or soldiers by issuing pardons.  Indeed, he would offend 
voters and soldiers in Minnesota and perhaps Wisconsin.  Lincoln 
had received political pressure from the army, the civilian 
leadership in Minnesota, Senator Wilkinson, and the state’s 
congressmen.  Had Lincoln followed his own political instincts, or 
done what was politically expedient, he would have approved all of 
the executions and ordered General Pope to move swiftly to 
eliminate the problem of the Indian prisoners. 
On the other hand, if Lincoln followed his general view of 
executions and military trials—which apparently he did—he would 
have to examine every one of the trial records.  The many military 
pardons Lincoln had already issued had convinced him that 
military trials were notoriously unfair and often without any 
meaningful due process.  As a trial lawyer, the President was 
particularly sensitive to the unfairness of military trials.  In addition, 
Lincoln and members of his cabinet were skeptical of the reports of 
many generals.  Many generals constantly wanted more troops and 
equipment, constantly overestimated Confederate troop strength, 
and then did not perform in battle.  General Pope, who had just 
embarrassed the administration with his huge loss at the Second 
Battle of Bull Run, had little credibility with the administration.  
His reports of Indian atrocities in Minnesota did not impress 
 
 147.  Nichols, supra note 3, at 3. 
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Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who believed the tales of 
Indian “barbarities” were “greatly exaggerated.”148 
While Sibley, Pope, Ramsey, Wilkinson, and other politicians 
and citizens in Minnesota pressed Lincoln to let the executions go 
forward, Lincoln also heard from a few people on the other side of 
the issue.  There was a memorial from a group of Quakers in 
Pennsylvania, but that was to be expected.149  Most scholars who 
write about the pardon process assert that Bishop Henry B. 
Whipple, the head of the Episcopal Church in Minnesota, 
convinced Lincoln to pardon most of the convicted Dakota.150 
How much influence Bishop Whipple had over Lincoln is 
uncertain.  Scholars cite Whipple’s autobiography, in which he 
describes his meeting with Lincoln while he was in the East to 
attend the Episcopal General Convention.151  At the meeting with 
Lincoln, Whipple discussed the corruption of the entire Indian 
Agency system, explaining how Indian agents, Indian traders, and 
others systematically cheated the Indians while lining their own 
pockets.  Whipple claims in this book that Lincoln was “deeply 
moved” by their conversation, and that later Lincoln told someone 
that Whipple “talked to me about the rascality of the Indian 
business until I felt it in my boots.”152  However, this meeting took 
place in mid-September, before the conflict in Minnesota was over, 
and of course, before any Dakota had been put on trial.  Whipple 
was in Washington at about the time of the battle of Antietam, 
where he preached to the First Minnesota and met General George 
B. McClellan.153 
 
 148.  WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 186. 
 149.  See Senator Morton S. Wilkinson, Speech at the Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 
13th Sess. (1862); see also Chomsky, supra note 3, at 30; Herbert, supra note 4, at 
780. 
 150.  Nichols, supra note 3, at 9. 
 151.  HENRY B. WHIPPLE, LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF A LONG EPISCOPATE 136–37 
(1899). 
 152.  Id. at 137.  Many historians quote this story, but there is no source for it 
beyond Whipple’s recollection.  Whipple wrote about this in 1899, thirty-seven 
years after the events took place. 
 153.  See Diary of Bishop Henry B. Whipple (1864) [hereinafter Whipple 
Diary], in THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, 1859–1899, box 42 (on file with Minn. Hist. Soc’y).  
The Abraham Lincoln papers at the Library of Congress contain an undated 
calling card from Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, to Lincoln, 
introducing Lincoln to Bishop Whipple.  See THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra 
note 13.  Chase was active in the Episcopal Church and would have been a natural 
contact for Whipple.  The Library of Congress erroneously dates this calling card 
as “December 1862.”  This dating is incorrect since Whipple was in Minnesota at 
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Because this meeting took place before the conflict was over 
and of course before any Indians were being tried for crimes, 
Whipple could not have lobbied Lincoln to pardon anyone.  His 
conversations probably touched on the cause of the conflict in 
Minnesota.  But they were mostly about general Indian policies and 
the corruption of Indian agencies.  This would have comported 
with a long letter Whipple sent Lincoln in March 1862 about the 
failures of Indian policies and the dishonesty of Indian agents.154  In 
that letter he complained that Indian agents were “often men 
without any fitness, sometimes a disgrace to a Christian nation; 
whiskey-sellers, bar-room loungers, debauchers.”155  When Whipple 
met with Lincoln in September, with the conflict in Minnesota still 
raging, he probably continued to denounce the entire system of 
Indian agents.  But, there is one oddity about this meeting with the 
President: Whipple made no mention of meeting the President in 
his personal diary,156 although he did record many of the people he 
met, including General McClellan, noted churches he preached at, 
and towns he visited.  It seems incomprehensible that he would 
have not noted this meeting in his diary.  Thus, his discussion of 
this meeting in his memoirs, published thirty-seven years later, 
makes one wonder if the meeting took place.  Moreover, in 
Whipple’s memoirs he offers no source or explanation of how he 
heard that Lincoln said Whipple had made Lincoln feel the 
“rascality” of the Indian agencies in his “boots.”157  Whipple’s 
discussions of the corruption of the Indian agency system would 
probably have affected Lincoln’s views of the causes of the violence 
in Minnesota, but Whipple could not have been lobbying Lincoln 
for leniency before any trials took place. 
After the trials Whipple lobbied Lincoln from a distance, but 
he was clearly ambivalent about what should happen to the 
convicted Dakota warriors.  He wrote to Senator Henry M. Rice on 
November 12, asking him to deliver a letter to Lincoln on the 
 
that time.  The footnote to this document also erroneously claims Whipple talked 
to Lincoln about the Dakota prisoners at this time, which would have been 
impossible, since there were none yet, because the meeting would have taken 
place in September, and not December. 
 154.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 6, 1862), in 
WHIPPLE, supra note 151, at 510–14. 
 155.  Id. at 511. 
 156.  Whipple Diary, supra note 153.   
 157.  The lack of any mention in his diary or in any other source corroborating 
this meeting does not prove Bishop Whipple did not meet with the President, but 
it does weaken the case for it. 
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proposed executions.158  He praised Rice as “the only public man 
who has at all times recognized the wickedness of our Indian 
system.”159  He told Rice: “We cannot hang men by the 
hundreds.”160  Whipple argued that the captured Indians were 
“prisoners of war” and it would violate “our own premises” to hang 
them.161  But it does not appear this letter was directly about the 
executions and trials.  On November 20, Senator Henry M. Rice 
sent Lincoln a petition from eighteen Episcopal bishops and 
another twenty or so other leaders of the church,162 asking for a 
comprehensive reform of American Indian policy.  The petition 
began with a reference to the “recent Indian attack” but then 
immediately went to a discussion of needed reforms in Indian 
policies.  Whatever Whipple and the other Bishops thought about 
the executions, they wanted the tragedy to lead to significant 
reforms.163  Senator Rice delivered the petition to Lincoln, met with 
the President, and on November 27, reported back to Whipple that 
the President would advocate reform of the Indian agency system 
in his annual message to Congress.164  However, Rice did not 
indicate that he discussed the convictions of the Dakota soldiers 
with the President.165 
A few days later Whipple reiterated his “demand” for “a 
reform” of the entire Indian agency system.166  But then Whipple 
clarified his views on the trials and executions, which Rice had 
apparently misunderstood from Whipple’s earlier statements, 
objecting to “hang[ing] men by hundreds.”167  Whipple flatly 
declared that when it came to the convicted Dakota soldiers he did 
 
 158.  There does not appear to be an actual copy of this letter in existence, 
only the cover letter Whipple sent Rice.  See Letter from Henry B. Whipple to 
Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), in THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, 
letterbook 4. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Letter from Henry M. Rice to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 20, 1862), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13. 
 163.  Letter from Protestant Episcopal Church to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 20, 
1862), in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13. 
 164.  Letter from Henry M. Rice to Henry B. Whipple (Nov. 27, 1862), in THE 
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 3. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 29, 1862), in THE 
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 3. 
 167.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), in THE 
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 4. 
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not “desire to screen the guilty murderers.”168  He objected to the 
irregularities in the commission’s work and wanted someone to 
“carefully scrutinize between the guilty & innocent.”169  He feared 
for the many innocent Dakota in federal custody because of the 
public “cry to exterminate every one who had a red skin.”170  But “as 
a law abiding man” he was prepared to “bow to the supremacy of all 
decisions lawfully conducted.”171  His only concern was whether the 
convicted Dakota had fair trials “such as to carefully scrutinize 
between the guilty and the innocent.”172  Thus, even the most 
committed friend of the Indians in Minnesota was, in the end, not 
troubled by executing some Dakota soldiers, even though he had 
initially argued that the captured Indians were “prisoners of war” 
and it would violate “our own premises” to hang them.173 
Whipple’s concerns were mostly about the Indian system, and 
only tangentially about the condemned Dakota.  On December 4, 
Whipple wrote Lincoln directly, thanking him for supporting a 
reform of the entire Indian system, which was “a stupendous piece 
of wickedness.”174  Whipple enclosed a “history of the causes of the 
late fearful massacre,” but he did not urge Lincoln to pardon the 
Dakota.175 
The petition from Whipple and the other Episcopal bishops 
surely had some impact on Lincoln’s thinking.  By this time 
Lincoln fully understood that the Indian agents and traders in 
Minnesota had been outrageous in their greed and incompetence.  
He also fully understood that many of those sentenced to die were 
innocent of any “outrages.”  Along this line, Lincoln received a 
letter from Stephen R. Riggs, a missionary and the chaplain to 
General Sibley’s command.  He noted that “among those 
 
 168.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 29, 1862), in THE 
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 3. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Henry M. Rice (Nov. 12, 1862), in THE 
WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 4. 
 174.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 4, 1862), in 
THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153, box 40, letterbook 3.  The actual letter to 
Lincoln is found in Record Group 48: Records of the Office of the Secretary of the 
Interior, Entry 649: Records of the Indian Division, 1828–1907, General Records, 
1838–1907, Letters Received, 1849–1880, National Archives College Park, College 
Park, Maryland. 
 175.  Id. 
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condemned there are various grades of guilt from the men who 
butchered women and children to the men who simply followed 
with a party for the purpose of taking away spoils from the homes 
of settlers who fled.”176  But Riggs also admitted that most of the 
convicted men “were condemned on general principles, without 
any specific charges proved.”177  Riggs told Lincoln “there is room 
for the exercise of your clemency.”178  Riggs then suggested some 
specific men who should be pardoned. 
The petitions of Whipple and the other bishops, Senator 
Rice’s conversations with Lincoln, and other communications 
condemning the trials doubtlessly affected Lincoln’s thoughts on 
the subject.  He told Rice he would raise the issue of Indian reform 
in his annual message to Congress (the nineteenth century 
equivalent of the State of the Union Address), which led Bishop 
Whipple to profusely praise and thank Lincoln.179  But 
communications on the other side, including lobbying by Governor 
Ramsey, Senator Wilkinson, General Pope, and others in the state, 
urging speedy execution of all the Dakota also must have weighed 
on Lincoln’s mind.180  Bishop Whipple argued for justice and 
humanitarian concerns for the Dakota; Ramsey and others argued 
for justice for the dead settlers and for the good of the Republican 
Party in the state.  Ultimately, however, the concerns of those in 
Minnesota were only part of the process that led Lincoln to pardon 
the overwhelming majority of the Dakota soldiers who were 
sentenced to death. 
VII. LIEBER, THE LAW OF WAR, AND THE DAKOTA 
The Dakota trials and Lincoln’s effective pardon of the vast 
majority of those sentenced to death must also be seen in the 
context of the emerging law of war within the administration.  On 
April 24, 1863, the administration would promulgate Francis 
 
 176.  Letter from Stephen R. Riggs to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 17, 1862), in 
THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Letter from Henry B. Whipple to Abraham Lincoln (Dec. 4, 1862), in 
THE WHIPPLE PAPERS, supra note 153.   
 180.  Letter from M. S. Wilkinson, Cyrus Aldrich, and Wm. Windom to 
Abraham Lincoln, in Message of the President, supra note 7, at 2–4.  Morton S. 
Wilkinson was the U.S. Senator from Minnesota, while Aldrich and Windom were 
the state’s two Congressmen.  All three were Republicans. 
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Lieber’s code of war, known as General Orders 100.181  This code, 
or even a draft of it, was not available to Lincoln in December 1862.  
Lieber first suggested writing the code to Major General Henry 
Halleck on November 13, 1862, and it was December before the 
project began.182  Lieber wrote quickly, but he did not have a draft 
of the Code until February, and therefore had nothing to give the 
President before the pardons were issued.  However, Lieber 
influenced Lincoln in other ways. 
After the first Battle of Bull Run, on July 21, 1861, the 
administration was uncertain what to do with captured Confederate 
prisoners.  If secession was illegal, as Lincoln contended, then the 
Confederates were little more than brigands, or perhaps some form 
of land-based pirates, making war on the general populace, and 
might be sent to hard labor, imprisoned, or even summarily 
executed.  But, such a solution would only lead to retaliation by the 
Confederacy against U.S. soldiers, and encourage barbaric behavior 
on both sides.  But, if the captured Confederates were treated as 
soldiers in battle, Lincoln and Attorney General Edward Bates 
worried this would be a de facto recognition of the Confederacy as 
a legitimate nation. 
On August 19, 1861, Lieber published an open letter to 
consider the nature of Confederate prisoners.  He noted that this 
was an issue that called for “[c]onsiderations of law, authority, 
humanity, [and] wise foresight.”183  The issue concerned the 
treatment of captured Confederates—whether they were soldiers or 
pirates—and also how captured U.S. soldiers might be treated.  In 
arguing that traditional rules of war should be applied to prisoners, 
he asserted that this was not a formal or diplomatic recognition of 
the Confederacy but was merely “the recognition of reality.”184  
Lieber offered an analogy which set the issue out clearly: “When a 
highway robber asks my purse, and I, being unarmed, consider it 
expedient to give it, I certainly recognize the robber, it is no more 
than recognition of a fact.”185  For humanitarian reasons it was also 
 
 181.  Gen. Orders No. 100, reprinted in RICHARD SHELLY HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S 
CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45–71 (1983). 
 182.  See Special Orders No. 399, War Dept., Adjutant General’s Office, 
Washington D.C., Dec. 17, 1862, in 2 OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND 
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 951; see also JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S 
CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 3 (2012). 
 183.  Francis Lieber, The Disposal of Prisoners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 1861, at 5. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. 
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important that Confederate prisoners be treated as legitimate 
belligerents under international law.186  This would not be 
recognition of the Confederacy and would not even prevent a 
subsequent prosecution for treason if that was what the 
government wanted to do.  But it would be a practical solution to 
the problem, since both sides had captured each other’s soldiers.  
Eventually Lieber’s theory would lead to prisoner exchanges.  In 
this letter Lieber noted, but dismissed, the idea of executing 
prisoners of war.  This would in effect reduce the United States to 
the level of the Jacobins during the French Revolution who 
“guillotined . . . the prisoners they made.”187  Lieber’s point was 
clear: civilized, humane nations did not execute prisoners of war. 
In a subsequent essay published in 1862, Lieber set out rules 
for dealing with guerrilla soldiers and other irregular forces.188  
Here he argued that “guerrillamen, when captured in fair fight and 
open warfare, should be treated as the regular partisan is, until 
special crimes, such as murder, or the killing of prisoners, or the 
sacking of places, are proved upon them.”189  Lieber argued that 
this was the precedent of “the most humane belligerents in recent 
times.”190 
These two theories were available to Lincoln when he 
considered the cases of the Dakota warriors.  Lincoln seemed to 
have acted on both theories.  In reviewing the cases, Lincoln made 
a sharp distinction between Indian soldiers, who simply 
participated in combat, and those who raped, killed women and 
children, or killed prisoners.  This last point would have been 
particularly important to a careful and logical attorney like Lincoln.  
If it was wrong—a war crime—for Indians to kill prisoners, then 
would it not have been equally wrong—equally a war crime—for 
the United States to execute prisoners? 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  FRANCIS LIEBER, GUERRILLA PARTIES CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE TO THE 
LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR, WRITTEN AT THE REQUEST OF MAJOR-GENERAL HENRY W. 
HALLECK (1862), reprinted in HARTIGAN, supra note 181, at 31–44.  
 189.  Id. at 20. 
 190.  Id. 
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VIII.  “I COULD NOT AFFORD TO HANG MEN FOR VOTES.”191 
In the end, Lincoln was pulled in many directions by the 
Dakota Rebellion.  A humane chief executive, he was unable to 
even consider the mass hanging of hundreds of men.  The Civil 
War was bloody enough, and there was no end in sight.  Lincoln 
had no stomach for what the generals and politicians in Minnesota 
wanted.  From the moment he heard of the push for mass 
executions, he made it clear that he was skeptical about the idea. 
The first word of mass executions reached Lincoln in mid-
October.  On October 9 General Pope informed General Halleck 
that the “Sioux war may be considered at an end,” but that the 
bloodletting was not over.192  Pope reported that he had 1500 
prisoners and that many of them were being “tried by military 
commission . . . and will be executed.”193  He reported he had 
seized “a number of Winnebagoes” and that he had “destroyed all 
the fields and property of the Sioux,”194 even though most of the 
Sioux had not participated in the violence and the Winnebagoes 
had not been involved at all.  He told Halleck he planned to renew 
his attacks on the Sioux in the spring and that “[t]he Indians are 
greatly terrified.”195  However we characterize the events of the fall 
of 1862—insurrection, war, or rebellion—Pope was planning to 
escalate the violence into what can only be described as a war of 
genocide.  For Pope the mass execution of prisoners was the 
beginning of this process. 
Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton presented this report to 
the Cabinet on October 14.196  Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles 
was “disgusted” with Pope’s report, the “tone” of which was 
“discreditable.”197  Welles noted that the Winnebagoes had “good 
land which white men want and mean to have.”198  Welles also 
observed that there was nothing in the reports to indicate why this 
violence had erupted, and he suspected—correctly—that the 
Indians in Minnesota had some legitimate grievances. 
 
 191.  Diary of Alexander Ramsey (Nov. 23, 1864), quoted in LINCOLN AND THE 
INDIANS, supra note 1, at 118.   
 192.  Letter from John Pope to H. W. Halleck (Oct. 9, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 722. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  WELLES DIARY, supra note 105, at 171. 
 197.  Id.  
 198.  Id. 
39
Finkelman: I Could not Afford to Hang Men for Votes—Lincoln the Lawyer, Huma
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2013
  
444 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:2 
We do not know what the rest of the cabinet thought about 
this, but Lincoln immediately informed the military authorities that 
there would be no hasty executions.  A disappointed General Pope 
told General Sibley that, “[t]he President directs that no executions 
be made without his sanction.”199  When the Dakota were 
sentenced, Pope dutifully sent Lincoln a list of those to be 
executed, and as we know, Lincoln immediately asked that all the 
records of the trials be forwarded to him. 
Meanwhile, Lincoln received letters from people in Minnesota, 
mostly urging that the Dakota be executed.  Governor Ramsey was 
apoplectic when he contemplated that some might not be 
executed.  But he also offered Lincoln a way to avoid having blood 
on his hands.  Ramsey suggested: “If you prefer it turn them over to 
me & I will order their Execution.”200  Senator Wilkinson and the 
state’s two congressmen pushed Lincoln hard for speedy 
executions.  Even Reverend Riggs, who urged Lincoln to “exercise 
your clemency,”201 also expressed “a great necessity . . . to execute the 
great majority of those who have been condemned by the Military 
Commission.”202 
Bishop Whipple and other clergymen reminded Lincoln of the 
corruption of the Indian system, the failure of the allotments to 
arrive, and the real threat of starvation among the Indians.  Their 
desperate situation may not have justified killing civilians, but 
going to war with the United States was not totally unjustified.  
Lincoln also heard from William P. Dole, the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs, whom he sent to Minnesota.  Dole communicated to 
Secretary of the Interior Caleb B. Smith,203 who passed the letter on 
to Lincoln “concurring in the humane views” of Dole.204  In his 
letter, Dole condemned the “indiscriminate punishment of men 
who have laid down their arms and surrendered themselves as 
prisoners.”205  He suggested that the trials and the planned 
 
 199.  Letter from John Pope to Henry H. Sibley (Oct. 17, 1862), quoted in 
LINCOLN AND THE INDIANS, supra note 1, at 96. 
 200.  Telegram from Alexander Ramsey to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 28, 1862), 
in THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.    
 201.  Letter from Stephen R. Riggs to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 17, 1862), in 
THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13. 
 202.  Id. 
 203.  Letter from William P. Dole to Caleb B. Smith (Nov. 10, 1862), in THE 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13. 
 204.  Letter from Caleb B. Smith to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 11, 1862), in THE 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.  
 205.  Letter from William P. Dole to Caleb B. Smith (Nov. 10, 1862), in THE 
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executions were merely “revenge” rather than “the infliction of 
deserved punishment,” and thus they were “contrary to the spirit of 
the age, and our character as a great, magnanimous and christian 
people.”206  Dole urged Smith to pass his letter on to Lincoln to 
“prevent the consummation of an act which I cannot believe would 
be otherwise than a stain upon our national character, and source 
of future regret.”207 
In pardoning the vast majority of those condemned to death, 
Lincoln accepted the recommendation of his own Commissioner.  
It dovetailed with his own persistent opposition to needless killing 
and his lifelong commitment to due process of law.  Lincoln was 
doubtlessly shocked by the lack of specific evidence for many of 
those convicted and the apparent unwillingness of the military to 
even attempt to treat the prisoners individually and assess their 
guilt or innocence on an individual basis.208  In the early stages of 
the trials, General Sibley had admitted that “the proceedings . . . 
may not be exactly in form in all the details.”209  But this lack of due 
process clearly did not bother him.  Perhaps if a handful of Dakota 
had been sentenced to death after such proceedings, as 
Confederate guerillas had been in Missouri,210 Lincoln might not 
have been too concerned either.  But Lincoln refused to approve 
the bloodbath that Sibley, Pope, and Governor Ramsey wanted on 
the basis of such shoddy and suspect proceedings. 
Lincoln’s decision to review the proceedings and spare the 
lives of the overwhelming majority of those convicted also 
comported with the emerging views of the War Department on the 
role of law in military affairs.  Lieber’s arguments about prisoners 
of war and guerillas probably played into this.  So too did the 
realization that the nature of the Civil War itself was changing.  On 
August 17, Lincoln signed two laws that allowed for the enlistment 
of black troops: The Second Confiscation Act211 and The Militia Act 
of 1862.212  A week later, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton 
 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN PAPERS, supra note 13.   
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See supra note 34. 
 209.  Letter from Henry H. Sibley to John Pope (Oct. 7, 1862), in OFFICIAL 
RECORDS OF THE UNION AND CONFEDERATE ARMIES, supra note 8, at 717. 
 210.  Herbert, supra note 4, at 791–93 (discussing drumhead prosecutions and 
summary executions of guerillas in Missouri). 
 211.  Second Confiscation Act, Ch. 195, §11, 12 Stat. 589, 592 (1862). 
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authorized General Rufus Saxton, who was based at Hilton Head, 
South Carolina, to begin to enlist black troops.213  Now that the 
United States was enlisting and training black soldiers, Lincoln had 
to be even more concerned about the fate of captured prisoners.  
Confederates might soon be seeking to execute or enslave black 
soldiers they captured.  This would turn the war into one of 
unmitigated barbarism as the United States would then have to 
retaliate by executing captured Confederates.  These were real 
possibilities.  Executing enemy soldiers—even Indian enemy 
soldiers—was not only immoral, but it would set a dangerous 
precedent.  If Lincoln allowed the execution of Indian soldiers on 
the grounds that the Indian attacks on the frontier were barbaric, 
then the Confederates could respond that from their perspective 
putting free blacks and former slaves in uniform and giving them 
guns was also barbaric.  The military and civilian authorities in 
Minnesota wanted to execute the Dakota because they believed 
such executions would prevent future frontier warfare and thus 
save the lives of civilians and soldiers.  But Lincoln’s view from the 
White House was the opposite.  Executing Indian prisoners of war 
would only serve to justify Confederate executions of black U.S. 
soldiers (and their white officers).  Rather than saving lives, a mass 
execution in Minnesota could have cost lives in the larger Civil War 
that was most important to Lincoln. 
On December 1, Lincoln asked Judge Advocate General 
Joseph Holt, of the U.S. Army, for advice on how to deal with the 
convicted men.  He was clearly planning to pardon many of the 
Indians.  He asked Holt “whether I should conclude to execute 
only a part of them, I must myself designate which, or could I leave 
the designation to some officer on the ground?”214  Holt replied 
that day, telling the President he could not delegate his pardon 
power “and that the designation of the individuals, which its 
exercise involves, must necessarily be made by yourself.”215  Holt 
said that he knew of no instance where any president had 
attempted “the delegation of this delicate and responsible trust.”216  
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Holt then made the observation that was obvious to others in the 
administration, including Lincoln, that “[i]n view of the large 
amount of human life involved in these proceedings, [it would] be 
well—if this step has not already been taken—to submit them to 
the Attorney General for the purpose of more satisfactorily 
determining the question of their regularity.”217  The point seems 
clear: the leaders of the army were concerned about the lack of due 
process, the rush to judgment, and the large amount of life at 
stake.  In the midst of America’s bloodiest war, even the leaders of 
the army were concerned about executing more than 300 men 
after trials that on their face were, at best, parodies of the legal 
process. 
Lincoln, following his own humanitarian instincts and his 
lawyerly training, and backed by members of his cabinet, his 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, and the Judge Advocate General 
of the U.S. Army, moved to mitigate, as much as possible, the 
barbarism of hanging more than 300 men, especially when it was 
obvious many were not guilty of any crimes.  Thus, the President 
ordered his subordinates to divide the convicted Dakota into two 
groups: those “who were proven to have participated in massacres”218 
which were “distinguished from participation in battles.”219  In doing 
so, Lincoln was forced to accept some of the findings of the military 
commission, even though he knew those hearings were deeply 
flawed and jurisprudentially scandalous.  Carol Chomsky argues 
that Lincoln’s “judgments” to allow any executions were 
“questionable” because all the trials were “flawed.”220  But this 
argument ignores the fact that some of those executed had openly 
bragged about killing civilians, and that some of the evidence for 
what amounted to war crimes was persuasive and compelling.  
Moreover, in the world of 1862, with the Civil War raging, with a 
miniscule staff, and the issues of the real war constantly pressing 
him, Lincoln may have done as much as he could have done—and 
spent as much time as he could afford—to correct the miscarriage 
of justice that took place in Minnesota. 
Furthermore, Lincoln tried to balance justice with military 
concerns, issues involving the ongoing War of the Rebellion, and 
fear of renewed violence in Minnesota.  As he told the Senate, he 
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was “[a]nxious to not act with so much clemency as to encourage 
another outbreak, on the one hand, nor with so much severity as to 
be real cruelty, on the other.”221  In the end, he spared seven out of 
every eight of the convicted men.  In hindsight, he should have 
pardoned more and required new trials—fair trials—for those 
going to the gallows.222  Clearly, Lincoln and his advisors 
understood the many problems with the trials and the lack of due 
process.  But the lack of due process for those who were executed 
was swallowed up by the complexities of the Civil War, the distance 
between Washington and St. Paul, and the myriad of other 
demands on Lincoln’s time and attention.  In December 1862 he 
had other things on his mind—the ongoing campaign against the 
Confederacy and the implementation of the final Emancipation 
Proclamation on January 1, 1863.  Thus, on December 6, he sent 
General Sibley a list of forty men who would be executed.223  By the 
time of the executions this would be reduced to thirty-eight, as two 
more men were reprieved. 
Lincoln expected there would be a huge political cost for this 
massive commutation.  Lincoln may have allowed a certain amount 
of rough justice, and rough injustice, to settle the matter, but he 
fully understood that his massive commutation—which would 
effectively be a massive pardon—would probably not satisfy the 
demands for vengeance and mass executions in Minnesota.  But, 
Lincoln was willing to accept these political costs because the 
alternative was to acquiesce in the executions of over 300 men, 
most of whom had not committed any recognizable crime. 
Ultimately, the political cost turned out to be not as great as 
Lincoln feared.  Minnesota troops would continue to fight bravely 
and gallantly against the Confederacy.  The people of Minnesota 
would remain mostly loyal to the Union cause.  In 1864, Lincoln 
would carry Minnesota by 7000 votes.  This was not as large as his 
10,000 vote victory in 1860, and given that the state had a larger 
population by 1864, the decline in his margin of victory was even 
greater.  He had carried 63.5 percent of the popular vote in 1860 
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but only 59.1 in 1864.224  This decline was noticeable, but hardly a 
threat to Lincoln or his party’s power in the state.  After the results 
were in, Alexander Ramsey, who by then was a U.S. Senator, told 
Lincoln “that if he had hung more Indians, we should have given 
him his old majority.”225  It is difficult to know if Ramsey was 
attempting to make a joke,226 or if he was offering serious political 
advice.  Lincoln replied with a more sober point that reflected his 
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